Market Engineering, SS 2014, gehalten am 03.06.2014
Autor
Beteiligtes Institut
Genre
Beschreibung
This lecture covers auction mechanisms for allocating goods which are sold in bundles. Basics of combinatorial auctions, the exposure problem are covered. The use case of the Generalized Vickrey Auction is dealt with in depth. The lecture wraps up with computational considerations for allocation and payment methods, and how computation costs can be considered in the mechanism design process, by applying suitable heuristics.
Laufzeit (hh:mm:ss)
01:24:08
Serie
Market Engineering, SS 2014, Vorlesungen
Publiziert am
06.06.2014
Fachgebiet
Lizenz
| Auflösung | 800 x 600 Pixel |
| Seitenverhältnis | 4:3 |
| Audiobitrate | 31997 bps |
| Audio Kanäle | 1 |
| Audio Codec | aac |
| Audio Abtastrate | 22050 Hz |
| Gesamtbitrate | 98514 bps |
| Farbraum | yuv420p |
| Container | mov,mp4,m4a,3gp,3g2,mj2 |
| Medientyp | video/mp4 |
| Dauer | 5048 s |
| Dateiname | 2014-439_cam.mp4 |
| Dateigröße | 4.096 byte |
| Bildwiederholfrequenz | 30 |
| Videobitrate | 59945 bps |
| Video Codec | h264 |
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