Market Engineering, SS 2014, gehalten am 03.06.2014
Author
Participating institute
Genre
Description
This lecture covers auction mechanisms for allocating goods which are sold in bundles. Basics of combinatorial auctions, the exposure problem are covered. The use case of the Generalized Vickrey Auction is dealt with in depth. The lecture wraps up with computational considerations for allocation and payment methods, and how computation costs can be considered in the mechanism design process, by applying suitable heuristics.
Duration (hh:mm:ss)
01:24:08
Series
Market Engineering, SS 2014, Vorlesungen
Published on
06.06.2014
Subject area
License
| Resolution | 800 x 600 Pixel |
| Aspect ratio | 4:3 |
| Audio bitrate | 31997 bps |
| Audio channels | 1 |
| Audio Codec | aac |
| Audio Sample Rate | 22050 Hz |
| Total Bitrate | 98514 bps |
| Color Space | yuv420p |
| Container | mov,mp4,m4a,3gp,3g2,mj2 |
| Media Type | video/mp4 |
| Duration | 5048 s |
| Filename | 2014-439_cam.mp4 |
| File Size | 4.096 byte |
| Frame Rate | 30 |
| Video Bitrate | 59945 bps |
| Video Codec | h264 |
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Market Engineering, SS 2014, Vorlesungen
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